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The Judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the LaGrand'
case has not to date resulted in a discernible improvement in United States
compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.2 The gross
deficiencies of U.S. practice regarding consular access under Article 36 of the
Convention are a sad but telling reflection of the unreality of international law
in the United States today. The lessons from LaGrand are varied and
important.
First, consular dccess is an individual right The LaGrand judgment
affirms that the right to consular notification and access guaranteed by Article
36(1)(b) of the Convention is an individual right of detained persons,3 which
may be asserted by their state of nationality in proceedings under the Optional
Protocol to the Convention.4  The United States had argued that "rights of
consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention are rights of
States, and not of individuals, even though these rights may benefit
individuals by permitting States to offer them consular assistance."5
As the ICJ noted, the language of Article 36(1)(b) could hardly be
clearer in its conferral of rights on detained individuals. Significantly, this
subparagraph ends with the following language: "the said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this
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1. LaGrand Case (F.RG. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261.
3. Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention provides:
With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the
sending State:
b) ihe so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay,
inform the consular post of the sending State if within its consular district, a national of
that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in
any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person
arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities without
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subparagraph." Moreover, under Article 36(1)(c), the sending State's right to
provide consular assistance to the detained person may not be exercised if he
expressly opposes such action. The clarity of these provisions, viewed in their
context, admits no doubt. 6 That Article 36(1)(b) has been so systematically
misinterpreted in the United States is troubling, and reflective of a resistance
to view treaties as a meaningful source of legal constraint on the conduct of
domestic officials.
Second, the judgment provided a rare instance in which the treaty
obligations of the United States, affecting individual rights, were subject to
binding international adjudication. Rights under such ratified treaties as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)7 and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 8 are regularly violated by the
United States, without effective redress, because of peculiar but dominant
contemporary views of treaties held by domestic authorities responsible for
their implementation. 9 LaGrand reveals that U.S. disregard of individual
treaty rights is not simply a problem of a lack of legally binding international
mechanisms for interpretation and enforcement of treaties. 10 Even where an
authoritative international body conclusively finds that the United States has
violated a treaty, domestic bodies remain unruffled and complacent. A deeply
ingrained pattern of treaty violations proceeds apace. Violation of the Vienna
Convention is costless to those committing the violations. The judiciary
continues to ignore violations of the Vienna Convention, as if the ICJ had not
spoken.
Note, for example, the eight decisions rendered by federal courts of
appeals between July 2001 and March 2002 concerning violations of the right
of consular notification and access." In all eight cases, clear and uncontested
violations of Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention were committed by
federal law enforcement and detention officials. 2 In none of the cases did the
court provide any remedy for these violations. Only one of the opinions even
mentions the ICJ's LaGrand Judgment. 3
6. Id 77.
7. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
8. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
9. Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J.
INT'LL. 313 (2001).
10. For example, failure to comply with the ICCPR is sometimes attributed to the extensive
reservations, understandings, and declarations the United States entered with its ratification, as well as to
the U.S. failure to ratify the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
11. U.S. v. Dixon, No. 01-4298, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 2402 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2002); U.S. v.
Cowo, No. 00-1499, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 24963 (lst Cir. Nov. 20, 2001); U.S. v. Carrillo and Soto,
269 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Dwyer,
No. 99-2483, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16142 (6th Cir. July 16, 2001); U.S. v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d
377 (6th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Felix-Felix, 275 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Bustos de la Pava, 268
F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2001).
12. That these eight cases all involved violations by federal officials underscores the fact that
LaGrand is not simply a problem of federalism. Compliance with LaGrand requires more than
modifying the procedural default rules that bar federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoners situated as
the LaGrands were.
13. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d at 987 n.3 (rejecting relevance of LaGrand because the ICJ
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Writing one month after the ICJ's judgment in LaGrand, the Tenth
Circuit opined that "it remains an open question whether the Vienna
Convention gives rise to any individually enforceable rights.' 14 In dicta, the
Second Circuit stated four months after the LaGrand judgment that the
Vienna Convention creates no individual rights. 5 In several cases, courts
found Vienna Convention claims to be foreclosed by the Circuit's pre-
LaGrand precedents, holding either that the Convention confers no rights to
individuals or that the remedy sought (suppression or dismissal of indictment)
is unavailable. 6 The Courts of Appeals have continued to rely on pre-
LaGrand interpretations by the Department of State that "the Vienna
Convention does not create individual rights." 7 The cases betray a deep
skepticism of treaties as legal, rather than political, instruments. 8
The United States voluntarily accepted the mechanism of the Optional
Protocol to resolve disputes over the interpretation of the Vienna Convention.
The ICJ has spoken, quite clearly, that Article 36(l)(b) confers individual
rights. Yet U.S. courts continue to rely exclusively on their own contrary
precedent and the views of the Department of State that the ICJ rejected in its
LaGrand decision.
Third, the ICJ was curiously diffident on the question of whether the
right to consular notification and access is a human right. Having found that
Article 36(1)(b) creates an individual right, the court reserved the issue
pressed by Germany that this right "has today assumed the character of a
human right."'9 Unmentioned in the LaGrand Judgment is the well-reasoned
Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on The Right
to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of
the Due Process of Law.20 The Inter-American Court's authority to interpret
did not specifically consider the applicability of the exclusionary rule to violations of the Vienna
Convention).
14. Id at 986.
15. Bustos de la Pava, 268 F.3d at 164-166, 167 (Sack, J., concurring). ("Although this
statement and the corresponding discussion, based on minimal briefing, seem to me clearly to be dicta, I
see no reason to decide so broad and potentially sensitive an issue of international law.").
16. Felix-Felix, 275 F.3d at 635; Cowo, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 24963, at *2; Carrillo and
Soto, 269 F.3d at 771; Dwyer, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16142, at *7.
17. U.S. v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Bustos de la Pava, 268
F.3d 157, 165 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying upon Department of State argument, rejected by the ICJ in
LaGrand, that preambular language in the Vienna Convention relating to immunities of consuls
indicates that Article 36(1)(b) creates no individual rights in detainees).
18. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 389 ("[C]ourts presume that the rights created by an
international treaty belong to a state and that a private individual cannot enforce them.").
19. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 LC.L 78 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org. In oral pleadings before the IC1, Dr. Bruno Simma stated that "the right to information under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention constitutes an individual, indeed, a human right." Verbatim Record,
Lagrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), ICJ Doe. CR 2000/26, 1 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org. He further submitted that "in the light of the development of international human rights law
subsequent to the conclusion of the Vienna Convention in 1963, Article 36 has assumed the character of
a human right pertaining to foreigners." Id 7. Referring to the Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, infra note 20, Dr. Simma urged the ICJ to conclude that "Article 36 constitutes
an individual right of foreign nationals and is to be regarded as a human right of aliens." Id. 14.
20. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of
the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 16 (1999), 141.
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the Vienna Convention hinged on whether the Convention contains provisions
"concerning the protection of human rights in the American States,"21 and thus
it was far from diffident about the human rights implications of denying
consular access to foreign criminal suspects. The Inter-American Court
expressed the view, inter alia, that the phrase "without delay" in Article
36(1)(b) requires notification to a detainee "at the time of his arrest or at least
before he makes his first statement before the authorities"; that the
individual's rights are not contingent on state protest; that violations of Article
36(1)(b) are prejudicial to due process and that death sentences imposed on
victims who have been denied consular access may violate the prohibition on
arbitrary deprivation of life in Article 4 of the American Convention on
Human Rights and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; and that federal states have the same obligation as unitary
states to respect Article 36(1)(b).22
Fourth, the ICJ clarified that provisional measures indicated under
Article 41 of its Statute impose a binding legal obligation. Twice the United
States has executed foreigners in the face of Article 41 provisional measures
by the ICJ requesting a stay of execution until the condemned men's rights
under the Vienna Convention could be adjudicated. 2  The United States
exploited the ambiguity in the legal character of provisional measures, leading
the ICJ to analyze at length the nature of its Article 41 authority.' 4
The text of Article 41 is susceptible to differing interpretations
concerning whether the indication of provisional measures creates a binding
legal obligation. The terminology ("indicate," "ought to be taken," and
"suggested") is not unambiguously expressive of prescriptive intent. Indeed,
the United States argued with some force that "the preponderant view is that
an indication of interim measures [by the ICJ] is not binding."'  The
implications of the ICJ's bold decision to claim binding legal effect for
provisional measures indicated under Article 41 remain to be seen.
The ICJ also found that "the various competent United States authorities
failed to take all the steps they could have taken to give effect to the Court's
Order."'  The Department of State had simply transmitted the ICJ Order of
March 3, 1999 to the Governor of Arizona, who determined to reject the
recommendation of the Arizona Board of Clemency to grant a stay of
21. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, article
64(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
22. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 20, 141.
23. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999); Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 41, 59
Stat. 1055, 1061.
24. LaGrand Case (F.RG. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 92-110 (June 27), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org.
25. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (F.RG. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Pleadings
(Lagrand Case) 139 (March 27, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org (quoting L. Collins,
Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation, in RECUEIL DES COURS/COLLECTED




execution to Walter LaGrand.27 In response to Germany's petition for a stay
of Walter LaGrand's execution, the Solicitor General argued before the
Supreme Court that provisional measures ordered by the ICJ are not legally
binding.' This categorical statement went beyond the representations made to
the Supreme Court in the Breard case concerning the "substantial
disagreement among jurists as to whether an ICJ order indicating provisional
measures is binding."29
This aspect of the LaGrand judgment may have the most profound
implications. William Aceves has already identified three possible
consequences: (1) that a breach of an obligation to comply with provisional
measures could be found, even though the ICJ ultimately determines that it
lacked jurisdiction over the dispute; (2) that, for this reason, the ICJ may
hesitate to indicate provisional measures in response to exparte requests and
under the time pressures presented in the LaGrand case; and (3) that the poor
record of state compliance with provisional measures may persist even after
the clarification of their binding legal nature, ultimately undermining the ICJ's
authority.3" In addition, another possible result of the decision may be a
general reluctance of states to seek provisional measures and for the ICJ to
indicate them, because of their significant legal consequences, even where
time permits greater deliberation.
Fifth, the ICJ largely leaves open the issue of the proper remedy for a
violation ofArticle 36(1)(b). Because the individual right is to notification and
access, and not to consular assistance, the harm caused by the treaty violation
in any particular case is often indeterminable. Concerns about causation and
harm in part underlie the reluctance of U.S. courts to order suppression of
evidence, dismissal of indictment, or reversal of convictions as a remedy for
undisputed violations of the Vienna Convention. The United States argued
that an apology and its program disseminating information about the Vienna
Convention should suffice.31 The ICJ ventured beyond this position, but in
limited and indefinite directions:
The Court considers in this respect that if the United States should fail in its obligation of
consular notification to the detriment of German nationals, an apology would not suffice
in cases where the individuals concerned have been subjected to prolonged detention or
convicted and sentenced to severe penalties. In the case of such a conviction and
sentence, it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow the review and
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violations of the
rights set forth in the Convention. This obligation can be carried out in various ways. The




29. Id 112 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 49, Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-1390)).
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The meanings of "prolonged detention" and "severe penalties" are as
indeterminate as the resulting obligation to "allow the review and
reconsideration" of convictions and sentences. The way in which the US will
fulfill this obligation is left open to domestic determination.
The failure of the ICJ to specify the mechanisms for domestic "review
and reconsideration" in cases involving violations of Article 36(1)(b) can be
defended as an appropriate accommodation of permissible variations among
national criminal justice systems and as deference to national authorities'
better grasp of remedial realities. However, the ICJ's failure to specify the
precise remedial action that must be taken for proven violations of Article
36(1)(b) leaves U.S. courts adrift and likely will result in more decisions
similar to that of the Tenth Circuit in Minjares-Alvarez in which the court
declined to provide a remedy for violations of international treaty law,
rejecting the relevance of LaGrand because the ICJ did not specifically
consider the applicability of the exclusionary rule to violations of the Vienna
Convention.33 The changes that must be made to the procedural default rules
that barred federal habeas corpus relief for the LaGrand brothers and for
Breard also remain uncertain.
Sixth, LaGrand is, and at the same time is not, a death penalty case. The
Vienna Convention does not differentiate between the rights of capital
defendants and other foreign detainees. Yet, there can be little doubt that the
death sentences imposed on the LaGrand brothers strongly influenced
Germany's willingness to bring proceedings against the United States. Even
the Supreme Court has recognized that "the penalty of death is different in
kind" and demands more rigorous procedural safeguards.34 But, because the
actual harm caused by a denial of consular notification is often difficult to
determine even in a capital case, it is hard to tailor a remedy to the severity of
the deprivation. Violations of consular notification and access are pervasive,
and freeing all the victims is not a realistic form of reparation. The ICJ and the
Inter-American Court limit their demands for vigorous remedial steps to
cases in which severe criminal penalties have been imposed.3" There is a
certain justice in this resolution, but also an equal lack of logic.
Seventh, the reciprocity of treaty obligations provides insufficient
leverage to induce U.S. compliance with certain treaty obligations. Human
rights obligations erga omnes are frequently breached by states, with little fear
of retribution. Although systematic U.S. noncompliance may endanger U.S.
33. U.S. v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986-988 (10th Cir. 2001).
34. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1978).
35. LaGrand, 125 (noting that an apology is insufficient where the victim of a violation of
the Vienna Convention has been subjected to prolonged detention or severe criminal penalties);
Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 20, 125-137 (noting that Mexico had framed its request for
an Advisory Opinion in terms of the consequences of violations of the Vienna Convention in death
penalty cases, and concluding that violations of Article 36(1)(b) are prejudicial to due process, that
imposition of the death penalty after denial of consular notification and access is a violation of the right
not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, and that such a violation gives rise to an international obligation to
make reparations).
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citizens abroad and create tensions in relations with other states, it is evident
that this risk poses no real concern to officials in a position to affect U.S.
practice regarding consular notification.

